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Abstract 
Studies of the relationship between the welfare and regulatory state have hitherto either focused 
on the latter displacing the former (Majone,1997), or presented regulation as an alternative means 
for achieving welfare goals (Levi-Faur,2014). Little is known, however, about their varied mutual 
interactions. This paper addresses that gap by examining the co-evolution of workers’ 
compensation and occupational safety regulation in Germany, France, U.K. and Netherlands. 
Drawing on an extensive international analysis of primary documents, secondary literature and 
interviews with regulator, insurance, business and labor representatives, the paper identifies 
strikingly varied but stable national preferences for: a) the use of financial vs. regulatory 
instruments; and b) the allocation of regulatory responsibilities between state and nonstate actors. 
The paper presents a novel explanation of that variation as dependent on the relative coherence 
of interactions between the particular cost-control logics of welfare provision and wider norms 
and traditions of state action in each country. 
 
1 Introduction 
Celebrating the 125th anniversary of Bismarck establishing the world’s first statutory system for 
workers’ compensation, the DGUV – the umbrella organization for Public Accident Insurers in 
Germany – highlighted how much this cornerstone of Germany’s welfare state depends on 
preventative regulation: “Successes in accident prevention are crucial to ensuring the financial 
stability of the social insurance system” (DGUV,2010:12). This Bismarckian model of welfare 
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provision through sectorally organized social insurance funds has been widely emulated 
(Parsons,2002), but its success, as the DGUV argues, depends on the underlying “unity” of 
preventative regulation with welfare compensation. This unity is essential because effective 
regulation is key not only to avoiding work-related harm but also to containing welfare costs and 
ensuring the economic competitiveness of an advanced capitalist society.  
While it is well-recognized that other welfare states are organized differently, it is less clear 
whether this variety in welfare state models can help explain long-recognized differences in 
national regulatory style (Vogel,1986). Is the described unity of preventative regulation and fiscal 
compensation in the German case distinctive to Bismarckian welfare states? To what extent might 
alternative welfare state models promote different styles of regulation? These questions about the 
interdependence of welfare and regulation have hitherto received little attention in either the 
welfare state, or regulatory state, literatures. Although a few comparative welfare state scholars 
have used regulatory form as an indicator for distinguishing alternative models of welfare state 
provision (Emmenegger,2011; Leisering,2011a; Reibling,2010), most comparative social policy 
research has analyzed variable welfare provision without considering its implications for the 
organization of regulation (e.g. Castles et al.,2010). By the same token, scholars of regulation have 
tended to overlook the structure of the welfare state as a potential factor shaping national 
differences in instrument preferences or reliance on subsidiarity and co-regulation. Thus, extensive 
debates about the well-recognized differences between Anglo-Saxon and Continental European 
states’ use of market-based regulatory instruments have paid little attention to whether these 
differences in regulatory style might reflect, or even be shaped by, differences in their respective 
welfare state arrangements (Bailey,2007; Meckling and Jenner,2016). 
 Responding to recent calls for rapprochement between hitherto largely separate literatures 
on the ‘regulatory’ and ‘welfare’ state (Haber,2017; Levi-Faur,2014), this paper explores the role 
of national welfare state arrangements as an ‘institutional input’ variable (Guidi et al.,20XX) 
shaping both the organization of regulatory systems and their preferred instruments for ensuring 
compliance; i.e. ‘regulatory outputs’. To that end, it examines occupational health and safety 
(OHS) regulation and its relationship to variable arrangements for workers’ compensation from a 
historical institutionalist perspective (Mahoney and Thelen,2015). Rather than focusing on often 
short-lived political coalitions and their influence on policy change, the historical institutionalist 
perspective exposes the long-term patterns of regulation and compensation in different countries 
and their potentially complementary logics of interaction since the formative period of OHS 
policies. Some have called workers’ compensation the “prelude to the welfare state” 
(Fishback,2000), but in many ways it also marked the beginning of the regulatory state. At the end 
of the nineteenth-century, regimes for protecting workers against occupational injury through 
preventative regulation emerged simultaneously across the industrializing economies of Europe 
and North America alongside parallel welfare regimes for providing social security payments to 
compensate for injuries and death (Hennock,2007; Mares,2003). This co-evolution makes OHS a 
crucial case for examining what Levi-Faur (2014) has called the ‘regulatory welfare state’ in which 
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redistributive fiscal transfer regimes condition, and are conditioned by, associated regulatory 
regimes. 
 To assess these potential interdependencies, the paper starts by reviewing alternative 
approaches to conceptualizing the relationship between the welfare state and the regulatory state 
and develops hypotheses about how preventative regulation might vary across countries with 
different welfare state arrangements. It then compares the institutional (co-)evolution of OHS 
regulation and workers’ compensation across a purposefully-selected sample of four advanced EU 
member state economies with differing models of welfare provision: the U.K., Germany, France 
and the Netherlands. The paper finishes by discussing its implications for deeper understanding of 
the relationship between the regulatory state and the welfare state from a comparative political 
economy perspective. 
 
2 Regulation and its relationships to the welfare state 
To date there have been only limited engagements between the large comparative literatures on 
the regulatory state and the welfare state. One classic approach to conceptualizing the ‘regulatory 
state’ sees it emerging from the eclipse of the welfare state and an associated shift in the logic of 
governance from one based on ‘rowing’ and direct service provision by the state to ‘steering’ 
through regulation and indirect forms of directing the economy and society through contractual 
instruments, market-based incentives, and arms-length rule-making and oversight (Moran,2002; 
Rhodes,1996). Majone’s (1994;1997) influential analysis points to how “the beneficent role of the 
positive state—as planner, direct producer of goods and services, and employer of last resort—
began to crumble in the 1970s” (Majone,1997:141) in favor of new strategies based on economic 
liberalization, privatization of state-owned enterprises, delivery of public services through quasi-
markets, and reforms to tax and redistributive welfare. But far from rolling back the state, these 
reforms were accompanied by “an impressive growth of regulatory policy-making both at national 
and European levels…” driven by the same “…processes that have contributed to the decline of 
the positive state.” (ibid.:143). 
 Challenging the idea of the regulatory state simply displacing the welfare state, others have 
highlighted the potential for regulation to serve as an equivalent form of public welfare provision. 
Levi-Faur (2014) coins the term “regulatory welfare state” to capture this functional equivalence, 
insofar as regulatory instruments of rule-making and enforcement can have redistributive purposes 
that substitute for fiscal redistributions classically associated with the welfare state. For example, 
he points out how the policy goal of affordable rented accommodation can be served both through 
conventional fiscal transfers in the form of housing benefits to compensate for low incomes, as 
well as through regulatory controls on high rents. Haber (2011) offers another example of 
functional equivalence in the electricity sector, showing how Sweden uses regulation solely to 
ensure market competition while helping poor customers through the social benefit system, but the 
U.K. – with its more residual welfare arrangements – relies more heavily on regulating ‘social 
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tariffs’ for vulnerable consumers. Indeed, Mabbett (2010) argues that the regulatory state might 
potentially come “to the rescue” of the welfare state in times of austerity by achieving 
redistributive goals through functionally equivalent forms of regulation rather than direct public 
expenditure. 
While the above studies implicitly hint at variation in political economy, comparative 
welfare state research has only recently started examining the relationship between regulatory 
variation and wider welfare state arrangements. Comparative accounts of welfare state traditions 
(e.g., Esping-Andersen,1990; Schröder,2013) have highlighted how variation in social policy 
provision reflects different ideas about the respective role of state vs. market actors in combatting 
social ills. For example, while liberal welfare regimes rely on universal (Beveridgean) but residual 
welfare payments to compensate for market failure, ‘conservative’ welfare traditions prefer status-
maintaining Bismarckian social insurance arrangements, and ‘social-democratic’ regimes use 
generous universal benefits to increase social equality. Scholars argue that those distinctive ideas 
explain the varied regulatory arrangements that have accompanied the wide-spread privatization 
and marketization of social security provision in Europe (Ebbinghaus,2015; Leisering,2011a). For 
example, the private pension market in the U.K.’s liberal welfare state is larger but more highly 
regulated than in Germany’s conservative welfare state, which continues to rely widely on public 
and occupational old-age insurance schemes (Leisering,2011b). Similarly, long-established 
conceits of welfare states help explain the varied regulation of ‘activation’ services across Europe 
(van Berkel et al.,2011a). Thus, while the British Liberal-residual welfare state has created 
regulatory frameworks to manage competition between its state-run ‘Jobcentre Plus’ and private 
activation services, Dutch local welfare agencies – in a context of stronger trust in state provision 
– “decide what services are being outsourced, so that they do not compete with market actors” 
(van Berkel et al.,2011b:244). 
The assumption that institutions are broadly stable – determining which actors matter, how 
they conceive of their interests and hence structuring their political strategies and policy choices – 
is wide-spread in comparative political economy and welfare state research (Steinmo et al.,1992; 
Thelen and Mahoney,2015; cf. Pontussen,1995). Historical institutionalist explanations, however, 
have been critiqued for a lack of engagement with agency and resulted in calls for a “greater 
theoretical and empirical attention to the politics of path dependency” within the historical 
institutionalist paradigm (Peters et al.,2005:1297). Political coalitions between social partners and 
specific parties, for example, are deemed more capable of explaining both the origin of institutions 
as well as institutional change (Peters et al., 2005; Pontussen,1995). In the field of OHS, for 
example, both Hennock (2007) and Mares (2003) highlight how specific combinations of actors 
and their power struggles helped setting up workers compensation in the late 19th century in 
Western European countries. Yet, our analytical focus is not on the origins of institutions nor on 
short-term policy change. Rather, our contribution is to the debate about varieties of regulatory 
capitalism (see contributions in this special issue) by identifying and explaining relatively stable 
logics of interaction between prevention and compensation in the regulatory and the welfare state. 
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Historical institutionalist work in comparative political economy points to potential 
complementarities between regulation and forms of welfare provision across different political 
economy contexts. This claim is consistent with the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature, 
which, inter alia, argues that labor market regulation and welfare provision play institutionally 
complementary roles within wider capitalist coordination regimes (Hall and Soskice,2001). Thus, 
coordinated market economies are argued to favor strong labor market protections and generous 
welfare systems (i.e., Bismarckian social insurance) to protect investments in their highly skilled 
and specialized workforces, while liberal market economies are said to favor weaker labor market 
regulation and residual welfare systems because their competitiveness requires labor market 
flexibility (Estevez-Abe et al.,2001; Hay and Wincott,2012; Mares,2001). 
The law and economics literature also assumes potential complementarities between 
welfare systems and regulation, albeit from a different perspective. Its focus on the role of legal 
systems in promoting the efficient allocation of resources (Posner,1975) highlights how variable 
welfare state arrangements may shape the organization and instrument preferences of associated 
regulation. Thus, how countries strike a balance between ex ante regulatory controls and ex post 
payouts raises important questions of efficiency, given that too much focus on limiting payouts 
may result in over-regulation, while too much focus on limiting regulatory intervention may result 
in ballooning payouts. Optimizing that balance can, in turn, depend on instrument choice, be it 
tort, insurance or command and control regulation, each of which suffer from well-known 
constraints, such as victim access to tort, targeting of insurance premiums and the adequacy of 
regulatory rules. Likewise, optimal balances are likely to depend on the organization of regulatory 
and welfare responsibilities, given public choice style arguments that the most effective and 
efficient means of reducing moral hazard is by ensuing that those bearing the costs of risk are also 
responsible for regulation (Philipsen,2009). 
In different ways, these literatures suggest that the organization and instrument preferences 
of regulation may be sensitive to the cost-control concerns of different welfare states. For example, 
generalizing the DGUV’s claims of necessary “unity” between preventative regulation and welfare 
compensation, we might hypothesize that in conservative welfare states with Bismarckian 
compensation schemes, strong coordination between preventative regulation and insurance 
premiums and payouts is functionally desirable to ensure the financial viability of their 
hypothecated social insurance funds. By contrast, liberal welfare states with Beveridgean provision 
schemes have less reason to regard regulation as a cost-control lever and in need of coordination 
with welfare compensation because their benefits are funded through general taxation and so 
residualization, rather the internalization, is the principle means of cost control.  
The discussions, so far, suggest the emergence of different, and mutually economically 
efficient, relationships between the compensation logics of different welfare state models and 
preventative regulation.  At the same time, however, regulatory scholarship has long pointed to 
the existence of widely varying national ‘regulatory styles’ – broadly speaking, the ‘who does what 
and how’ of regulation – that are embedded within nationally distinctive and deeply entrenched 
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state traditions, comprising a complex mix of ideas about the role of the state vis-à-vis market and 
societal actors, legal constraints and traditions, and public administration architectures and 
practices (Adam et al.,2017; Brickman et al.,1985; Kagan,2000; Kelman,1981; Vogel,1986; Vogel 
and Kagan,2004). That raises the issue of how the economic logics of cost-control requirements in 
different welfare states interact with the political logics of wider state traditions in shaping the 
organization and instrument preferences of regulation. Do they always have a functional fit or do 
they ever conflict and with what consequences? 
For example, while some state traditions prefer to vest regulatory authority in the central 
state executive (e.g. France), others favor subsidiarity by delegating authority to non-state actors 
(e.g. Germany and the Netherlands). Some state traditions constrain regulatory action through 
constitutions that emphasize negative rights against state interference (e.g. Germany and USA) or 
positive rights to state protection (e.g. France), while other state traditions that are unencumbered 
by written constitutions take a more ad hoc approach to regulatory action (e.g. U.K.). Some state 
traditions favor modes of regulatory decision-making and enforcement that are formal and 
adversarial (e.g. USA), while other traditions are more informal and consensual (e.g. Netherlands).  
 That literature suggests that the ‘unity’ celebrated by the German social insurance bodies 
may be the result of a functional institutional fit between the cost-control logics of the Bismarckian 
system of welfare provision that favors strong coordination between preventative regulation and 
compensation arrangements and a German regulatory style which, in favoring subsidiarity to non-
state actors, can facilitate such coordination. We might likewise hypothesize – as we will explore 
below – that there is potential for a different type of fit in the British case, where the cost-control 
logics of its Beveridgean compensation approach do not depend on an ad hoc regulatory style for 
which welfare cost-control is simply a happy consequence of case-by-case attempts to address 
market failure. Such functional complementarities between welfare provision and regulation, 
however, are less likely to prevail in countries where the cost-control logics of their welfare states 
might be expected to depend on regulatory interventions that conflict with their regulatory state 
traditions. 
 
3 Comparative case-study design and methods 
To explore the extent to which welfare state arrangements and their relatively (in-)coherent 
interaction with variable state traditions shape regulatory organization and instrument preferences, 
this paper compares the evolution of, and interactions between, workers’ compensation and OHS 
regulation across four advanced European countries: Germany, the U.K., France and the 
Netherlands.  
Germany and the U.K. provide opposing cases of Bismarckian and Beveridgean systems 
of welfare provision. While Germany abolished employer liability in favor of a generous 
Bismarckian compensation scheme, the U.K. retained employer liability to supplement tax-payer 
funded universal healthcare and social security benefits (Parsons,2002; Gal,2004; Kangas,2010).  
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France and the Netherlands also originally opted for variants of Bismarckian social insurance, but 
France incorporated its regime into the Social Security system after WWII, with a stronger role for 
the dirigiste state (see below), while the Netherlands have gone further towards more universal 
and integrated provision over recent decades and which increasingly leans towards a Beveridgean 
provision approach (Schröder,2013:133f). 
 The four countries also vary in their wider state norms and traditions of regulatory action 
(Rothstein et al.,2013). Germany’s Rechtsstaat and federal structure strongly constrain state 
regulatory action and favor delegation to corporatist non-state actors, while the U.K.’s tradition of 
parliamentary sovereignty in the absence of a written constitution favors a more ad hoc approach 
to regulatory action. The French Republican tradition venerates the dirigiste state, identifying it 
with the general interest and charging it with the leading role in all aspects of regulation. By 
contrast, the Dutch polder model of consociational decision-making favors procedural solutions 
that are founded on agreement amongst, and often delegating authority to, the social partners. 
Empirically, the paper uses qualitative methods of comparative case study analysis 
involving triangulation between an extensive set of primary documents (n=98), secondary and 
historical literature reviews and a corpus of background interviews (n=42) with contemporary key 
regulators and experts from insurance and professional associations, business and labor 
representatives. These expert interviews were used for cross-validation of findings from document 
analysis1 and literature reviews covering the long span of historical analysis from the inception of 
OHS regulation and workers’ compensation in the late 19th century to the present. Having started 
our comparative analysis from a clear theoretical problematization, we used an inductive approach 
to explore the evolution of OHS regulation and its interaction with the logics of welfare 
compensation and wider state traditions. 
 
4. The (co-)evolution of occupational health and safety regulation and workers’ 
compensation 
Until the second half of the nineteenth-century, all four countries relied on a classically liberal 
approach to regulating OHS (Guyton, 1999). Workers and their employers were, in principle, free 
to bargain over safety provisions as part of their contractual negotiations, but in practice workers 
were at the mercy of their employers and tort suits were difficult to win. With the industrial 
revolution making workplace accidents more grievous and developments in tort making them 
costlier, all four countries moved, within a few decades of one another in the late nineteenth-
century, to establish regulatory regimes to prevent occupational injuries alongside welfare systems 
to compensate injuries and provide social security for widows, orphans, and invalids. OHS 
regulation in all four countries involved different balances between statutory and private rule-
making, as well as between the use of legal sanctions and financial, chiefly insurance-based, 
                                                          
1 To ensure readability we largely refrain from quoting primary documents and interviews, but details can be supplied on request. 
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instruments for ensuring regulatory compliance. The following section describes the history of 
these regulatory ‘outputs’ and their relationship to systems of workers compensation and welfare 
provision in each country. 
 
Germany  
Germany takes a so-called ‘dual system’ approach to OHS regulation, based on para-public 
regulation and inspection by an interventionist social insurance regime backed by broadly enabling 
statutory regulation and residual enforcement by generalist Länder labor inspectorates. The 
modern regulatory regime dates back to the 1891 Industrial Code, which set out employers’ broad 
obligations to protect workers against dangers to life and health (Wank,1992). However, this 
general duty was not judiciable (Hennock,2007: 131). Indeed, with a few exceptions, the German 
legal code contained almost no statutory OHS standards until the EU Framework Directive 
(89/391/EEC) was transposed in 1996. Instead, the state has long delegated the elaboration of 
detailed safety rules to the social insurance system. 
 Established by the 1884 Industrial Insurance Act, the German social insurance system 
abolished the civil liability of employers in favor of a strict no-fault liability scheme of tabulated 
compensation for all income and medical costs of work-related injuries, illness, and death 
(Hennock,2007; Simons,1984). The scheme has since been administered by the 
Berufsgenossenschaften (BGs); a set of powerful regional and sectoral mutual trade associations 
which, building on the German guild tradition, were established in law under the Social Code to 
be funded by mandatory employer contributions and governed by the social partners. As Hennock 
(2007) argues, the BGs solved the problem of funding worker sickness and disability benefits in a 
federal country where there was little state power to tax nation-wide. Indeed, Bismarck – generally 
seen as the intellectual father of social insurance – favored central state administration of insurance 
but was forced to delegate control of the new scheme to the BGs due to the joint opposition of 
large industrial manufacturers, who preferred corporatist self-regulation, and the Zentrumspartei, 
which was strongly federalist (Mares,2003:85; Simons,1984). Moreover, delegation to the BGs 
also fitted with nineteenth-century Prussian liberal state traditions that favored a coordinating role 
for the state over direct intervention (Huber,2009). Bismarck – a vociferous opponent of state 
interference in business affairs and frustrated with party politics – accepted BG control over social 
insurance as a compromise (Hennock,2007:93). 
That preference for corporatist action created a financial challenge in sustaining welfare 
provision without the deep pockets and taxation powers of a national treasury. As strictly self-
financing mutual organizations, the BGs needed powers both to internalize and limit compensation 
costs. As Mares (2001) has noted, the quid pro quo for compulsory participation by all employers 
who were collectively liable for replacing the wages and other costs incurred by injured workers 
was to create the BGs as para-public bodies with strong regulatory powers for accident prevention.  
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The BGs exercise this regulatory authority in three ways. First, they were given legal 
powers to create detailed ‘accident prevention rules’, which to this day are fleshed out by 
corporatist technical committees in formidably large and dense rule-books that are used by Länder 
Labor Inspectorates and the courts when assessing legal compliance and imposing any 
administrative law sanctions on violators (Rothstein et al,2017). Second, to incentivize accident 
prevention the BGs set premiums that can vary considerably dependent on the riskiness of the 
sector, individual firms’ accident record and inspection rating history (Paul and Huber,2015). 
Third, in the context of mandatory membership, mutualist BGs were authorized to create their own 
technical inspectorates, which operate in parallel to Länder Labor inspectorates to combat moral 
hazard by BGs members and provide training and expert advice about regulatory compliance. BGs 
undertake approximately twice the number of inspections as their statutory counterparts 
(LASI,2014; DGUV,2013) and have similar powers to issue fines and enforcement orders. Indeed, 
some – notably employer associations – have even questioned the necessity of Länder 
inspectorates (Gerlinger,2000), reflecting the longstanding hold of corporatist regulation in 
Germany. 
 In Germany, therefore, the joint-venture of a conservative welfare state tradition focused 
on social stability with an otherwise liberal state tradition focused on the avoidance of state 
intervention, and the resulting delegation to sectoral actors helped fashion an institutional structure 
that involved close complementarities between preventive regulation and social insurance. As 
Hennock (2007:99) has argued, “safety measures whose costs could not be justified by clearly 
foreseeable savings in compensation payments were ruled out from the beginning”. These days, 
BGs make three-way trade-offs between the safety of workers, the costs of compensation pay-outs 
borne by the BGs, and the competitive and other burdens of preventative safety measures agreed 
through tripartite corporatist negotiations (Ayaß,2012; Paul and Huber,2015). Moreover, 
compensation concerns have sometimes inhibited BGs from recognizing the occupational cause 
of certain diseases, as highlighted by a recent struggle over compensating for lung damage in 
aircrew due to so-called fume events in airplanes (Berndt and Ludwig,2018). 
 
France 
France also has a dual system for regulating OHS but in keeping with France’s more dirigiste 
traditions, the state plays a more dominant and less complimentary role to the social insurance 
system. France’s regulatory regime emerged with the 1893 Industrial Establishments Act, which 
required employers to provide ‘clean and safe working conditions’. As in Germany, this broad 
goal was not judiciable until the 1980s (Chaumette,1992:19,25). Unlike Germany, however, the 
goal was fleshed out through a complex system of parallel statutory and non-statutory regulations. 
Statutory regulations are set out by the Ministry of Labor in the form of an accumulating mass of 
detailed and inflexible rules in the Labor Code. These rules are enforced, using conventional 
administrative law sanctions by the state’s regionally-based Labor Inspectorate- the DIRECCTE- 
as part of their general duties to enforce all the other employment rights and provisions of the 
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Labor Code. Alongside this statutory regime, however, the French social insurance system also 
operates its own parallel quasi-regulatory regime of rule-setting and inspection which is described 
below.  
 The social insurance system’s role in accident prevention dates from the 1898 Workmen’s 
Compensation Act, which – like Germany – replaced the civil liability of employers with a no-
fault liability approach that used mandatory employer contributions to compensate workers 
generously for all income and medical costs of work-related injuries, illness, and death 
(Kangas,2010; Parsons,2002). Workers’ compensation was initially provided through highly 
fragmented and uneven private firm-level arrangements and national, regional and sectoral mutual 
associations – the Caisses – but was made more consistent and universal when it was absorbed 
into the new French social security system in 1946 as part of a wider shift towards “compulsory 
and centralized social policy” overseen by a much stronger state fulfilling its constitutional 
commitments to the republican principles of egalité and fraternité (Mares,2003:193). However, 
these reforms undermined the insurance logic of France’s formally mutualist system of workers’ 
compensation. Employer resistance to losing control over sectoral funds while still collectively 
liable for their costs, resulted in an uneasy compromise that extended social security benefits to 
workers not covered by sectoral accident prevention agreements, but left sectoral Caisses in 
control of premiums and other insurance conditionalities (ibid:209f). In turn the state now 
underwrites sometimes chronic gaps between Caisses compensation costs and premium income; 
Mutualité Social Agricole alone covers just under 10% of the population, but its income from 
premiums accounts for barely 35% of its pay-out costs (Pawlowska-Tyszko et al.,2013).  
 The problem facing the Caisses was that the cost-control imperatives of their Bismarckian 
system of workers’ compensation clashed with the French Republican state tradition in which the 
State is the formal guarantor of the general interest. It was, therefore, the State’s duty to make OHS 
regulations rather than the Caisses, whose financial sustainability depended on the rules of a 
statutory Labor Code it played no part in formulating (cf. Mares,2003). However, the sheer 
complexity of making detailed rules to meet the extraordinary variety of situation-specific 
workplace problems has proved to be beyond the Ministry of Labor, meaning that gaps and 
contradictions are inevitable. As the Ministry’s own inspectorate has stated ‘The Law in practice 
is, by nature, not fully overlapping with the Law… Full compliance with the law is aspirational’ 
(DIRECCTE,2012).  
The Caisses have compensated for these problems in three ways (HSE,1996; Cour des 
Comptes 2002). First, they issue their own detailed and sectorally-specific ‘accident prevention’ 
rules, which are overseen by the Caisses’ own technical inspectorates who can offer expert advice 
on compliance. Second, like Germany, the Caisses can also adjust premiums to reflect the so-
called ‘cost of risk’, dependent on compensation costs by sector and/or particular businesses and, 
following their inspectorates’ advice, increase contribution rates by 25% for non-compliance with 
accident prevention rules. Third, reflecting the republican commitments to fraternité, the Caisses 
can even subsidize workplace improvements. 
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 The result is a complex and contradictory layering of organizational responsibilities for 
OHS regulation in France. While the Caisses have a less formal regulatory role in accident 
prevention than the BGs in Germany, in practice they exert significant influence over workplace 
health and safety alongside a more strongly prevention-oriented state administration. Also, like the 
BGs, the Caisses’ role as regulators of workplace health and safety follows, as Rivest (2002:90) 
has argued, a ‘logic of compensation’ rather than simple safety improvement. Thus, as in Germany, 
they have been criticized for delays in recognizing certain occupational diseases, most notably 
asbestos-related mesothelioma, which became a major public scandal in France in the 1990s 
(ibid.:101). 
 
United Kingdom 
In contrast to the dual systems of Germany and France, the U.K. relies almost entirely on statutory 
OHS regulation and policing, which is organizationally detached from its Beveridgean health and 
welfare system for ensuring the social security of injured workers and other citizens. The 
regulatory regime was founded on the nineteenth-century Factory Acts, which evolved in an ad 
hoc and reactive way over the course of the twentieth-century. Indeed, as long ago as 1910, Sidney 
Webb described the regime as a “typical example of English practical empiricism. We began with 
no abstract theory of social justice or the rights of man… Each successive statute [was just] aimed 
at remedying a single ascertained evil” (Hutchins and Harrison,1966: preface). By the 1960s, the 
regulatory regime had evolved into an infamously prescriptive but gap-laden system whose rules-
based approach left millions of workers facing inconsistent and often inadequate levels of 
protection (Robens,1972). In response to political pressure from both organized labor and business 
about the toll of occupational injury (Sirrs,2016), the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act, 
abandoned detailed rules in favor of a principles-based approach to standard-setting, simply 
requiring that workers should not face unreasonable levels of risk from any hazard in any sector, 
whether or not anyone was actually harmed. Regulations are enforced using a ‘risk-based’ 
enforcement pyramid of criminal law sanctions by powerful expert inspectors who are employed 
by local authorities and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), a dedicated national regulatory 
agency created under the 1974 Act (Demeritt et al.,2015).  
 Compensation arrangements to cover workers’ lost income and medical costs have played 
no role in shaping the regulatory regime for preventing workplace accidents and ill-health. To 
supplement, rather than replace, the existing weak tort regime, the 1897 Workers’ Compensation 
Act imposed a no-fault duty on employers to pay for work-related accident and sickness costs for 
a range of industries (Lewis,2012). The compensation regime was extended to all workplaces by 
the 1911 National Insurance scheme, which was administered by state ‘approved’ mutual 
associations that were jointly funded by state and mandatory employer and employee contributions 
but without regard to the riskiness of individual workplaces (Hennock,2007). After WWII, the 
regime was ‘nationalized’ through the Beveridge reforms with injury costs and treatments 
socialized through a universal system of general taxpayer-funded disability benefits, a limited 
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industrial injuries compensation scheme (IIS) and the new National Health Service (NHS). Unlike 
France and Germany, tort was also retained to replace lost income and pay for enhanced care costs 
above the increasingly residualized benefits provided by the Beveridgean social security system. 
 In that Beveridgean welfare provision context, OHS regulation in the U.K. has not faced 
the same problems of internalizing disability benefit and healthcare costs faced by Germany and 
France. With workplace accidents and ill-health accounting for just a small part of their total costs, 
the tax-payer funded disability benefits regime and its famously ‘free at the point of delivery’ NHS 
have little financial incentive and no effective levers for influencing employers to improve 
occupational health and safety. Instead, the state has controlled costs by limiting victim benefits – 
i.e. disability benefits and industrial compensation scheme awards – to residual income 
replacement levels (Gal,2004; Kangas,2010), and, since 1990, has deducted costs for benefits and 
medical treatment from successful tort awards (Parsons,2002). While tort might have some 
disciplining effect on employers, insurance premiums account for only 0.25 per cent of national 
payroll and only half of employers employ enough workers to be rated according to their accident 
record (Lewis,2012). That means that the principal pressure on employers to reduce workplace 
accidents and ill-health comes not so much from efforts to contain their own compensation costs 
– unlike in Germany and partially France – but rather from a strong statutory regulatory regime, 
which operates only according to a logic of prevention. 
 
The Netherlands 
Like the U.K., the Netherlands also principally relies on statutory regulation and policing to 
prevent occupational injuries and sickness (de Gier,1992; Popma et al.,2002), though recent 
welfare reforms have seen it introduce some limited insurance incentives for injury prevention. 
The Dutch regime for OHS regulation was founded on the 1895 Safety at Work Act, which steadily 
expanded over the century to cover all sectors through a complex mixture of prescriptive statutory 
and non-statutory OHS rules and guidance formulated with advice from trade unions and sectoral 
associations (de Gier,1992). Regulations are enforced by a state Labor Inspectorate using a 
conventional enforcement pyramid of administrative law sanctions to ensure compliance with 
OHS rules as well as with minimum wage laws and other labor market regulations, as in France 
and Germany. Recent reforms have sought to introduce a more proportionate and targeted 
approach to OHS by replacing prescriptive statutory regulation with various non-statutory ‘Labor 
Catalogues’ (Stichting van de Arbeid, 2007). Developed jointly by employer and employee 
associations, they provide sectorally-specific advice on safety regulation and are given strong 
weight as evidence of compliance by the state inspectors and by the courts on those very rare 
occasions that safety disputes are not resolved informally, as is more typical of Dutch enforcement 
practice (Aalders and Wilthagen,1997; Van Waarden and Hildebrand,2009). 
 The Dutch welfare system combines elements of Beveridgean universalism, including a 
flat rate old-age pension and statutory individual health insurance, with Bismarckian arrangements 
for providing income-related sickness and disability benefits through sectorally mutualized social 
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insurers (Cox,1993). Despite its mutualist funding and corporatist organization, the Dutch social 
insurance regime, unlike its German and French counterparts, was not involved in preventative 
OHS regulation. The 1901 Work Accidents Act prohibited civil litigation in favor of income-
replacing disability pensions funded through voluntary employer contributions to a set of mutual 
insurance associations- the Bedrijfsverenigingen- jointly controlled by employer associations and 
trade unions. But unlike the BGs in Germany and the Caisses in France, the Dutch 
Bedrijfsverenigingen were limited to administering the disability payment system; they played no 
role in setting OHS standards or inspecting companies to calibrate premiums or provide technical 
advice on safety compliance (Popma et al. 2002). Over the century, the scheme expanded from 
covering only a small number of hazardous industries to eventually providing income-replacing 
pensions for all workers rendered incapable- whether through occupational injury or other cause- 
of continued employment (Parsons,2002). Disability pensions are funded through flat-rate payroll 
taxes and mandatory contributions from business set on a sectoral basis rather than firm-level risk-
rating, on the grounds that differentiation would undermine the Dutch ‘polder’ principle of 
solidarity. As Popma et al. (2002:181) explain, Dutch welfare provisions “originated largely from 
Christian forms of charity and mutual and professional arrangements” and so “remained immune 
to any instrumentalist policies for a very long time.”  
 Without insurance instruments for controlling moral hazard, the Bedrijfsverenigingen were 
vulnerable to their members externalizing the costs of firm-level restructuring onto the mutualist 
funds. During the 1970s and early 1980s the number of workers receiving disability pensions more 
than doubled, peaking at nearly 20% of the workforce; prompting reforms to the welfare system 
to combat what became known as the ‘Dutch disease’ (Aarts and Jong,1996; Burkhauser et 
al.,2008). Tort was reintroduced, benefits were cut, eligibility conditions were tightened, and the 
Bedrijfsverenigingen were incorporated into the Social Security Agency (UWV) to ensure their 
financial sustainability. At the same time, employer co-payments of disability costs and 
‘experience-rated’ premiums were introduced to discourage firms from using disability pensions 
as an alternative to redundancy. But with no basis for distinguishing occupational injury from other 
causes of disability and the degree of disability defined socially “as a worker’s particular incapacity 
to find a job similar to his former job” (Hemerijck,2003:57), these insurance measures focused on 
controlling all welfare costs rather than incentivizing OHS per se. 
 The principal mechanisms for OHS regulation in the Netherlands have remained statutory, 
despite further attempts to coordinate the regulatory system more closely with the social security 
system. Thus, the Labor Inspectorate was recently merged with the Social Security Inspectorate to 
clamp down on fraudulent disability claims and the UWV is now consulted over the corporatist 
Labor Catalogues so that accident prevention rules take some account of welfare costs (Rothstein 
et al.,2017). These limited reforms, however, do not seem prone to fundamentally shift the logic 
of OHS regulation from prevention to the insurance-based one of cost-control through 
internalization. 
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5 Discussion  
Comparing the four countries, OHS regulatory outputs vary in two distinctive ways (see Table 1). 
First, instrument preferences for ensuring compliance vary across countries, involving different 
balances between state regulatory sanctions and the financial levers of tort, insurance premiums 
and conditionality. Second, the organization of responsibilities for preventative regulation and its 
enforcement also vary between state and non-state actors. 
Thus, in Germany, OHS is principally governed by the mutual insurance associations 
(BGs) using financial levers of insurance to incentivize workplace safety. These private financial 
instruments are supplemented by detailed regulatory rules, which BGs set and enforce with their 
own expert inspectorates. That leaves the generalist state Länder labor inspectorates with a residual 
police function to further deter noncompliance with the same set of BG rules. In France, mutualist 
Caisses also govern OHS through financial levers of insurance that incentivize compliance with 
detailed safety rules that the Caisses themselves also set and reinforce through technical advice, 
financial support, and if necessary financial penalties issued by their own expert inspectors. In 
contrast to Germany, however, that corporatist social insurance regime operates in parallel to a 
separate statutory regime with its own voluminous regulatory rules set out in a proscriptive state 
Labor Code and which is only enforced by a generalist state labor inspectorate.  
By contrast, in the U.K., OHS regulation is entirely statutory and enforced by a muscular 
OHS inspectorate, supplemented by some limited financial incentives on employers through tort 
and private insurance. Historically, OHS regulation in the Netherlands was very similar, with 
statutory regulation enforced by a state labor inspectorate, although recent welfare reforms have 
seen those traditional arrangements supplemented by the introduction of new insurance 
conditionalities for disability benefits, while statutory regulation is being supplemented by various 
industry specific Labor Catalogues formulated by the social partners. 
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Table 1: National differences in the organization of responsibilities for preventative OHS 
regulation and instrument preferences for ensuring compliance 
 
  
Responsibilities for OHS Regulation 
 
Instruments for Ensuring OHS Compliance 
 
 Non-state State  Private financial 
instruments 
Legal sanctions 
Germany Rules formulated by 
social insurance BGs 
with own inspectorates 
to promote compliance 
Enabling legislation and 
policing to support BG 
self-regulation 
Risk-based premiums as 
well as fines, insurance 
conditionalities and 
other sanctions issued 
by BG inspectorates 
Administrative law 
sanctions to deter non-
compliance with BG 
rules 
France Private accident 
prevention rules 
formulated by social 
insurance Caisses with 
own inspectorates to 
promote compliance 
Detailed provisions of 
statutory Labour Code 
enforced by generalist 
Labour inspectorate 
Risk-based premiums 
and insurance 
conditionalities 
supplemented by 
Caisses investment to 
improve safety of 
dangerous facilities 
Administrative law 
sanctions for Labour law 
violations  
UK None Statutory regulations 
enforced by dedicated 
and technically expert 
government inspectors 
Limited tort and private 
insurance incentives 
Conventional 
enforcement pyramid 
backed by criminal law 
sanctions 
Netherlands Non-statutory Labour 
Catalogues formulated 
by sectoral associations 
and trade unions 
Statutory regulations 
enforced by generalist 
Labour inspectorate; 
Social Security 
Administration a 
consultee on non-
statutory Labour 
Catalogues 
‘Experience-rated’ 
premiums based on 
disability claims history; 
limited tort 
Conventional 
enforcement pyramid 
backed by 
administrative law 
sanctions 
 
These distinctive patterns of national preferences for the use of financial vs. regulatory 
instruments and the allocation of regulatory responsibilities between state and non-state actors 
have been relatively stable over the course of a century. This stability is perhaps unsurprising given 
that preventative regulation and welfare regimes to look after injured and sick workers have long 
been a universal pre-requisite for relative industrial peace and predictable business and legal 
environments for all developed capitalist societies.  However, the relative stability of these 
arrangements does suggest that the regulatory state – when it comes to OHS at least – is neither 
supplanting the welfare state, nor that the regulatory state is simply compensating for welfare state 
retrenchment in times of austerity. Moreover, the sheer longevity of these arrangements – 
surviving world wars and huge changes in the character of capitalist production and services– 
suggests that regulatory outputs are not simply a matter of contingent policy choices, shaped for 
example by the balance of power of organized lobbies or changing governments. Certainly, the 
precise stringency of individual regulatory interventions at any one time might be best explained 
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by the relative power and mobilization of labor and business organizations (Demeritt et al,2015; 
Paul and Huber,2015). Moreover, our analysis is consistent with prominent critiques of historical 
institutionalism (cf. Peters et al.,2005; Pontusson,1995) insofar as the formative periods of 
regulatory and compensation approaches in OHS have been shaped by political struggles between 
different interests and coalitions (see our debate about Bismarck’s struggle with the 
Zentrumspartei over a centralised vs. a sectoral-corporatist compensation regime). Yet, given the 
transitory character of political coalitions in each country, their variation seems to have little 
explanatory power for the longue durée patterns of interaction between regulation and 
compensation, that we have identified. 
Instead, our findings suggest that the patterns of instrument preferences and organization 
of regulatory responsibility are best explained by two key variables, or – as Guidi et al.(20XX) 
would term them – regulatory ‘inputs’. The first variable concerns the model of welfare state 
provision insofar as Bismarckian welfare state models involve distinct challenges of cost-control 
and internalization that favor different instrument preferences and allocations of regulatory 
responsibility to Beveridgean systems founded on universalism and funded by general tax 
revenues. The second variable concerns broader state traditions, insofar as the countries vary 
significantly in the normative underpinnings of regulatory action by the state. This discussion 
examines each variable in turn, starting with the different welfare state models and the ways in 
which their distinct cost-control problems shaped OHS regulation. 
Historically, all four countries started off with weak tort regimes that they either replaced 
or supplemented with very different models of welfare state provision for workers’ compensation, 
whose cost-control logics influenced the evolution of OHS regulation in different ways. 
Bismarckian welfare states, having abolished tort in favor of no-fault compensation, needed to 
ensure the financial sustainability of the mutualist social insurance funds established to fund 
compensation by providing them with the means to internalize compensation costs and control 
moral hazard by their members. To solve that problem, the French and German funds have used 
variable premiums and conditionality – set, monitored, and enforced through their own 
inspectorates – to ensure coverage of what the French Caisses call the ‘cost of risk’. However, the 
effectiveness of financial levers to keep these mutual funds solvent and incentivize workplace 
safety is limited; not least because, as mutuals, each fund entails a degree of risk pooling and 
premiums are necessarily limited to keep them affordable, on both insurance grounds of risk 
spreading and in response to pressure from more cost-sensitive firms. Therefore, following the law 
and economics argument that moral hazard is best avoided when those bearing the costs of risk are 
also responsible for regulation to reduce it (Philipsen,2009), both the German BGs and French 
Caisses sought to supplement purely financial incentives with their own industry-specific private 
regulatory standards and inspection to reduce accident burdens and protect their funds. 
The cost-control problems facing Bismarckian social insurance regimes are powerfully 
illustrated by the Netherlands, which is the proverbial exception that proves the rule. Having 
abolished tort in favor of dedicated funds to pay disability benefits, the Bedrijfsverenigingen faced 
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particularly high cost-control problems because – unlike their German and French counterparts – 
they did not use premium variation or conditionality as financial levers to control moral hazard 
and contain compensation costs. These cost-control problems became clear during the economic 
downturn of the 1970s and 1980s when the ‘Dutch disease’ of spiraling disability pensions forced 
sweeping welfare reform, including the incorporation of financially precarious 
Bedrijfsverenigingen into the state social security system, the merger of the labor and social 
security inspectorates, and the introduction of employer cost-sharing and other insurance 
conditionalities. 
By contrast, the U.K.’s Beveridgean arrangements for workers’ compensation do not 
require injury costs to be internalized through self-sustaining premiums because they are 
externalized to the state. Spreading the financial risks of occupational injury out amongst all 
taxpayers does create moral hazard problems but, as the costs of workplace harms are just one bad 
amongst many, they are relatively unimportant for overall welfare cost-control. In the absence of 
incentives and the fiscal levers to pressure businesses to reduce the toll from occupational injury, 
and with the state unwilling to increase taxes, the way for liberal Beveridgean welfare systems to 
control their costs is by reducing benefits and increasing their conditionality, supplemented by 
weak pressure from tort and associated employer private insurance. It is these market failures, 
more than the moral hazard involved in the Beveridgean welfare state supporting workers and 
businesses taking unreasonable risks in pursuit of higher wages and profits, that favor the 
governance of workplace safety through strong statutory preventative regulation. 
Welfare state arrangements, therefore, create a set of distinct logics around cost-control 
which take us a long way in explaining national variation in instrument preferences and allocation 
of regulatory responsibilities. Welfare states with Bismarckian insurance systems – exemplified 
by Germany – need closely coordinated regulatory interventions to supplement their financial 
levers for controlling costs, which one might expect to be best handled by the funds themselves. 
By contrast in systems where compensation costs are socialized – such as in the U.K. –, financial 
incentives play only a minor role in ensuring compliance; in the absence of a strong tort system 
there is a need for strong preventative regulation to correct market failure. However, the cost-
control logics of specific welfare state models can neither explain why France developed a parallel 
complex system of state regulation, nor why the Dutch disability benefits funds eschewed financial 
levers for incentivizing accident prevention and neither set nor enforced their own preventative 
regulations. 
Those residual questions are best explained by a second variable of wider state norms and 
traditions of action. European regulatory state traditions vary significantly in their degrees of state 
centeredness, which may complement or conflict with the instrument preferences and organization 
of regulatory responsibility favored for solving the distinctive cost-control problems posed by their 
welfare state models. Thus, in Germany’s Bismarckian welfare state, the need for close 
coordination between the BGs and preventative regulation fitted both with the Prussian liberal 
state tradition, which favored solutions by economic actors over direct state intervention, as well 
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as with the difficulties of imposing nationwide solutions on a strongly federal country. The result 
is a relatively coherent and self-contained regime where both compensation and preventative 
regulation are managed in a mutually supportive manner by the BGs, as they acknowledge in the 
opening quote of this paper. The U.K. is also relatively coherent insofar as the need for statutory 
regulation to counterbalance weak financial levers for endogeneously-incentivising OHS fits with 
a pragmatic state tradition that regulates in an ad hoc fashion to address market failures as they 
arise. In that context, the British approach to OHS regulation responded to political, rather than 
financial, demands from both employees wanting safe workplaces and employers wanting legal 
predictability and a level playing field.  
In the Netherlands and France, the relationship between the welfare provision and OHS 
regulation is less coherent, because the regulatory demands of their welfare state models clashed 
with their particular state traditions. Thus, in the Netherlands, the sustainability of Bismarckian 
provisions for workers’ compensation required fiscal levers for internalizing costs and controlling 
moral hazard that were incompatible with an ethic of universality and non-instrumentality that 
derived from a state tradition of ‘polder politics’, solidarity and social cohesion (Popma et 
al.,2002). That conflict did provoke some changes to both welfare provision and OHS regulation 
in an attempt to reduce incoherence but the scope for reform has been limited.  
The tensions in France were different to the Netherlands, however, insofar as the need for 
greater coordination between preventative OHS regulation and its Bismarckian provisions for 
workers’ compensation to ensure cost-control and internalization conflicted with Republican 
ideals of the dirigiste state as guarantor of the general interest. The result was two overlapping and 
inconsistent sets of statutory and private insurance rules and two separate inspectorates to enforce 
them, which has predictably resulted in significant problems. Indeed, that story points to important 
roots of what the VoC literature on mixed market economies (Thatcher,2007; Rothstein et 
al.,2017), claims is a diagnostically French (and Southern-European) coordination problem 
between corporatist actors and the state. 
 
6 Conclusions  
This study highlights a need to go beyond discussions of whether the regulatory state is supplanting 
the welfare state, is its functional equivalent, or is coming to its rescue. Instead, a comparative 
examination of the evolution of OHS regulation alongside workers’ compensation indicates that 
while the organization and instruments of welfare provision and regulatory control vary 
considerably across countries, the fundamental relationships between welfare provision and 
regulatory control – in terms of the division of who does what and how – have been relatively 
stable for over a century. Indeed, the paper’s key argument is that the balance of financial vs. 
regulatory instrument preferences and the allocation of regulatory responsibilities for governing 
OHS between state and non-state actors depends on boundary conditions that are shaped by 
systems of welfare provision and wider state traditions. 
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Thus, cost-control logics in Bismarckian welfare systems favor the use of financial 
instruments supplemented by closely coordinated preventative regulation, while in liberal 
Beveridgean ones, preventative statutory regulation is more or less the only available game in 
town. At the same time, the balance of instrument preferences and allocation of regulatory 
responsibilities are also shaped by the extent to which the cost-control logics of welfare provision 
are coherent with the norms and traditions of state action. Thus, the cost-control logics of 
Germany’s Bismarckian social insurance regime are coherent with state traditions that favor 
subsidiarity of regulatory controls to the funds, while the U.K.’s Beveridgean welfare provision 
aligns neatly with state traditions that favor regulation by the central state. By contrast, the cost-
control logics of Bismarckian social insurance is at odds with the state traditions of the other two 
countries. In France, such logics are in conflict with dirigiste state traditions, while in the 
Netherlands they struggle with non-instrumentalist philosophies of voluntarist consociationalism. 
More research is needed to assess the generalizability of our findings to the welfare systems 
and state traditions of other countries. The USA, for example, abolished tort a century ago in favor 
of complex worker compensation schemes that vary across states, that layer-up with other welfare 
regimes, and work in parallel with Federal regulation, which is typically constrained by judicial 
challenge. Conventional explanations for well-known weaknesses in rule-making and enforcement 
tend to concentrate on the superior fire-power of business over labor interests, but our analysis 
suggests that in such a fragmented system it is not surprising that organized labor tends to focus 
on compensation payouts rather than much harder to achieve regulatory change (Hirsch et 
al.,1997). Indeed, more generally, the findings of this paper point to how the politics of OHS, in 
at least all developed capitalist societies, is liable to be shaped and constrained by these deep and 
long-established, but country specific, institutional logics. 
 Likewise, research on other policy domains could establish whether OHS is a special case 
– having stood at the cradle of both the welfare state and social regulation – or whether institutional 
complementarities in this domain apply more widely. Disaster governance is one possible domain, 
insofar as the organization and instrument preferences of preventative regulation are likely to be 
sensitive to national arrangements for disaster insurance and emergency relief, given the tendency 
for relief to promote moral hazard and for structural flood prevention to contribute to a ‘levee 
effect’ of rising loss potential.  
Such further research tasks pending, this study will have achieved its aim if the institutional 
interdependencies between the fiscal compensation models of different welfare states and the 
prevention efforts of different regulatory states, as well as the outcomes of such linkages, feature 
more prominently in comparative governance research. 
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